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11, 15

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS R. COOK,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 860511

CHRISTIANSEN BROS. INC., a
Utah corporation; MONTMORENCY,
HAYES & TALBOT ARCHITECTS,
INC., a Utah corporation;
MHT ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah
corporation; HALVERSON
PLUMBING & HEATING, INC.,
Defendants/Respondents

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court err in finding as a matter of
law that the alleged negligence of defendants in placing a
drinking fountain eighteen inches from an oil floor drain in an
automotive center was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Complaint for personal injury damages was filed in the
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah
by plaintiff Dennis Cook, against defendants Christiansen
Brothers, Inc., Montmorency Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc.,
MHT Architects, Inc. and Halverson Plumbing and Heating.
Montmorency, Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc. filed a

Third-Party Complaint against third-party defendant Van Boerum
-4

& Frank Associates, Inc.

..

Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that he was injured in
a fall at the Sears Automotive Center at the Newgate Mall,
Ogden, Utah while working as an employee of Sears, Roebuck and
Company and that the fall was "the proximate result of
negligent design, construction in and placement of a drinking
fountain . . . .M

(R« 1). Defendant Christiansen Brothers,

Inc. was the general contractor for the Sears Automotive Center
at the Newgate Mall (R. 113), defendant Montmorency, Hayes &
Talbot Architects, Inc. was the project architect (R. 113),
defendant Halverson Plumbing and Heating was the mechanical
subcontractor on the project and third-party defendant Van
Boerum & Frank Associates, Inc. was the mechanical engineer on
the project.
By stipulation, plaintiff dismissed without prejudice its
claims against Halverson Plumbing and Heating.

(R. 39-40).

Plaintiffs claims against defendant MHT Architects, Inc. were
dismissed on Motion.

(R. 74).

Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and Montmorency, Hayes &
Talbot Architects, Inc. filed Motions for Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of plaintiffs Complaint.

Van Boerum &

Frank Associates, Inc. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
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pursuant to Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, joining in
the motions of Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and Montmorency,
Hayes & Talbot Architects, Inc. with regard to the dismissal of
plaintiff's Complaint and also filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment seeking the Dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint.
The Motions for Summary Judgment were argued before the
Honorable Judge David E. Roth on August 20, 1986.

Judge Roth

granted defendants' and third-party defendant's Motions for
Summary Judgment.

Summary Judgment was entered in favor of

defendants and third-party defendant on September 3, 1986.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the Summary Judgment
entered in favor of defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Dennis Cook, was employed by Sears, Roebuck
& Company as the Assistant Manager of the Sears Newgate Mall
Automotive Center in Ogden, Utah.

(Cook Deposition at 3, 4.)

It was plaintiff's responsibility to supervise the activities
of the 15 to 16 mechanics who serviced the 50 to 60 automobiles
served by the facility each day.

(Cook Deposition at 4, 25.)

The Sears Automotive Center at the Newgate Mall is a
rectangular facility with service bays along the length of the
structure on the north and south sides, 10 service bays on each
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side.

(Cook Deposition at 28.)

Approximately in the middle of

the automotive center along the north wall in the immediate
vicinity of two service bays a water fountain approximately 38
inches to 40 inches in height was installed next to the wall.
(Cook Deposition at 5/ 8.)

Along the same north wall to the

east about 18 inches from the easternmost side of the drinking
fountain was an opening in the concrete floor approximately 12
inches by 12 inches which was used as a floor drain for
disposing of engine oil and automatic transmission fluid
drained from automobiles during servicing.
5/ 46.)

(Cook Deposition at

The employees under plaintiff's supervision drained

engine oil and automatic transmission fluid from automobiles
into "waste-oil containersM which were about 3-1/2 to 4 feet
tall with a bucket built on top to catch the oil and other
fluids as they were drained from automobiles.
at 21.)

(Cook Deposition

The containers were capable of storing approximately

six oil changes.

(Cook Deposition at 46.)

After a container

was full, the mechanics would drain the container into the
floor drain by rolling the container over the floor drain and
opening a petcock at the bottom of the containers.
Deposition at 5, 21, 46.)

(Cook

The mechanics would occasionally

partially miss the floor drain while emptying the containers,
spilling oil on the concrete floor around the drain.
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Generally, the mechanic who dumped the oil would wipe up after
any spills in the vicinity of the drain and store maintenance
cleaned the entire shop each evening.

(Cook Deposition at 29.)

The "waste-oil containers" always leaked oil around
the petcocks and around the seal at the bottom of the
containers.

(Cook Deposition at 9, 21# 47.)

Since oil changes

were done in each of the 20 service bays# the waste-oil
containers were wheeled throughout the shop area during the
day.

(Cook Deposition at 47.)

During portions of the day and

on each evening the leaky waste-oil containers were stored by
the mechanics in the area of the drinking fountain and floor
drain.

(Cook Deposition at 9, 21.)
As in each of the other service bays, the two service

bays adjacent to the floor drain and drinking fountain
contained hydraulic racks used for hoisting automobiles.

The

racks were approximately 10 feet from the north wall of the
structure.

(Cook Deposition at 28-29.)

The hydraulic racks in

these bays, as well as in other bays, leaked oil.
Deposition at 21.)

(Cook

The two bays adjacent to the floor drain

and drinking fountain/ as all others, were used for changing
oil.

(Cook Deposition at 55.)

Along the same north wall/

right next to the area where the floor drain and drinking
fountain were located, dispensers of 90-weight gear oil and
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automotive transmission fluid were stored.
36.)

(Cook Deposition at

Mechanics would walk over to the area of the floor drain

to get these dispensers to roll them to the service bays.
(Cook Deposition at 36.)

After use of the dispensers, there

were some Nseeps" from the dispenser hoses.
at 37.)

(Cook Deposition

Also along the same north wall was a stand-up 55 gal.

drum of 10-40 weight motor oil with a stand-up pump in it.
(Cook Deposition at 37.)

The mechanics would pump the motor

oil into smaller containers used to add the oil to
automobiles.

(Cook Deposition at 38.)

Occasionally, spills of

oil occurred in this process, although not necessarily on the
floor.

(Cook Deposition at 38.)
The oil and other automotive fluids and lubricants

spilled on the floor of the automotive center in the process of
servicing the 50 to 60 automobiles per day was spread
throughout the facility.

The concrete floor was constructed of

black diamond concrete and was waxed periodically by store
maintenance, making it slick.

(Cook Deposition at 7, 30, 44.)

Oil spread very easily on the waxed concrete surface.
Deposition at 7.)

(Cook

If a person stepped in any oil, he would

track the oil throughout the shop.

(Cook Deposition at 54.)

The accident occurred on a Saturday when the shop was
at its busiest.

"There [was] oil all over the floor."
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(Cook

Deposition at 6, 16, 17.)

There was oil in each of the bays

(Cook Deposition at 6) and plaintiff/ in the performance of his
duties, was Min all of the bays all day long".
Deposition at 55.)

Plaintiff had oil on the soles of his boots

from walking through the automotive center.
at 7.)

(Cook

(Cook Deposition

This was "part of the automotive environment".

(Cook

Deposition at 17.)
Just before noon on November 21/ 1981/ plaintiff
walked from the service bays to the drinking fountain.
Deposition at 30-31/ Exhibit 1 to Cook Deposition.)

(Cook

While he

was stationary at the northeast corner of the drinking fountain
getting a drink of water# plaintiff heard one of his men# Tom
Shock/ call out his name.

(Cook Deposition at 31.)

Plaintiff

pivoted on his right foot to turn to face Mr. Shock and
slipped/ lost his balance/ and fell to the floor striking the
drinking fountain.

(Cook Deposition at 7# 32.)

There was approximately an 18-inch round spot of oil
on the floor just off to the east side of the water fountain
and off to plaintiff's right side as he stood at the drinking
fountain.

(Cook Deposition at 50.)

from one drop of oil.

The spot could have come

(Cook Deposition at 50.)

Plaintiff is

uncertain whether the oil came from storage of the leaking
waste-oil containers in this area# from a mechanic missing the
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floor drain while emptying the waste-oil containers or possibly
from oil spilled from surrounding storage tanks (the 10-40
weight bulk storage tanks or the 90-weight gear oil
dispenser).

(Cook Deposition at 38, 47.)

Plaintiff used the drinking fountain four to five
times some days, once or twice on others.
39.)

(Cook Deposition at

In the year that he had worked at the automotive center I

facility prior to the accident, plaintiff had never slipped or
fallen in the drinking fountain area (Cook Deposition at 39)
and plaintiff knows of no other persons who have slipped or
fallen in the drinking fountain area.
10.)

(Cook Deposition at

However, other persons had slipped in other areas of the

shop, but not all the way to the floor.

(Cook Deposition at

10.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Honorable Judge David E. Roth did not err in
granting defendants' and third-party defendant's Motions for
Summary Judgment.

The undisputed facts as stated in

plaintiff's deposition are that plaintiff simply slipped and
fell in an automotive center where oil was present throughout
when he sought to pivot to face a co-worker.

The fortuitous

fact that plaintiff had just taken a drink at the drinking
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS CORRECTLY GRANTED
WHERE ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BEFORE
THE COURT NO REASONABLY MINDED PERSON
COULD FIND DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE
WAS THE CAUSE IN FACT OF PLAINTIFF'S
FALL AND INJURIES WITHOUT RESORTING TO
SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment were granted
because on the undisputed facts contained in plaintiff's
deposition/ defendants' alleged negligence in the placement of
the drinking fountain 18 inches from the floor drain was not
the proximate cause of plaintiff's fall and injuries as a
matter of law.

Judge Roth stated:

The facts, apparently undisputed facts, are
that the Plaintiff simply slipped and fell
in a garage area. Had oil on his shoes.
There was oil on the floor. Apparently oil
all over the area of the garage.
The Plaintiff claims that the causation or
proximate causation of the accident was the
negligent design and construction whereby
the sump was located within 18 inches of the
water fountain. I don't buy the argument.
I don't think the sump location and the
water fountain location being 18 inches
apart is the cause of this accident.
Transcript on Appeal at 2, Addendum 1.
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Ordinarily, the issue of proximate causation should
not be decided as a matter of law on a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, supra at 245.

However, this Court has recognized that Min appropriate
circumstances summary judgment may be granted on the issue of
proximate cause",

id.; Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and

Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 1980).

This is

particularly so when plaintiff has failed to present a triable
issue on cause in fact.

This Court has consistently held over

the years that summary judgment is appropriate on the issue of
proximate causation if from the undisputed facts reasonably
minded jurors could find that the alleged negligence was the
cause in fact of the alleged injury only through conjecture and
speculation.

Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, supra; Staheli

v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah
1982); Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d
680 (1943).

See, Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).

It Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, supra, this Court
affirmed the entry of summary judgment on the issue of
proximate cause in a wrongful death action brought by the heirs
of a businessman murdered in his room at the Salt Lake Hilton
Hotel.

Although there was sufficient evidence to support a

finding that the hotel had been negligent in providing security
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that cause of action.
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In Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah,
supra, the case quoted by this Court in Mitchell, plaintiffs
sought recovery for grain they had entrusted to defendant for
storage which was destroyed in a fire at the storage
warehouse.

The actual cause of the fire was unknown.

The

possibilities included arson, spontaneous combustion,
negligence of the defendant, negligence of the plaintiffs or
their assignors, or the negligence of transients.
682.

655 P.2d at

Recognizing that it could not speculate as to the most

likely cause of the fire, this Court affirmed the trial court's
decision in part upon the grounds that proximate cause had not
been established as a matter of law.

655 P.2d at 684.

In Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., supra, the
plaintiff engaged defendant to tow his automobile to a garage
for repairs.

As the tow truck pulled into traffic with

plaintiff's automobile in tow, plaintiff's automobile was
struck from behind by a skidding coal truck.

The only alleged

negligence of the defendant was his failure to give an arm
signal before proceeding into traffic.

This Court held, in

affirming a non-suit at the close of the plaintiff's case, that
while there was sufficient evidence of negligence, there was
not a triable issue of proximate case.
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There was no evidence

that
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While deductions may be based on
probabilities, the evidence must do more
than merely raise a conjecture or show a
probability. Where there are probabilities
the other way equally or more potent the
deductions are mere guesses and the jury
should not be permitted to speculate. The
rule is well established in this
jurisdiction that where "the proximate cause
of the injury is left to conjecture, the
plaintiff must fail as a matter of law*
[citations deleted]. Many cases are cited
:i n support of this proposition, and the court:
quoted with approval from 29 Cyc. 625 where
it stated: "The evidence must/ however, do
more than merely raise a conjecture or show
a probability as to the cause of the injury,
and no recovery can be had if the evidence
leaves it to conjecture which of two
probable causes resulted in the injury,
where defendant was liable for only one
them."
132 P. 2d .it liM I
This Court's pi m i decisions are consistent with
Professor Piosser's L z e a t i s P I H I the 1 aw o f t o r t s , P r o s s e r, Law
ui

. j i t s ,

'II I

I'M

II '"I » II

ii!
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On the issue o f t he £ a c t o f c au s a t i o n, a s :::: ii
other issues essential to his cause of
action for neqliqence, the plaintiff, :i n
qeneral, has the burden of proof. He mi ist:
introduce evidence which affords a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that it
is moIP likp-v • I, dot that the conduct of
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the defendant was a substantial factor in
bringing about the result. A mere
possibility of such causation is not enough;
and when the matter remains one of pure
speculation or conjecture/ or the
probabilities are at best evenly balanced,
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a
verdict for the defendant.
In the case at bar# the evidence offered by plaintiff
as to the facts of this accident would not permit reasonably
minded jurors to find that it is more probable than not that
defendants' alleged negligence in locating the drinking
fountain 18 inches from the floor drain was a substantial cause
of plaintiff's injuries.

It is undisputed that the concrete

floor was waxed and slippery even without the presence of oil.
(Cook Deposition at 7, 30, 44.)

It is further undisputed that

there was oil all over the shop the day of the accident (Cook
Deposition at 6, 16) from leaking hydraulic racks in each of
the service bays (Cook Deposition at 21)/ from leaking
waste-oil containers (Cook Deposition at 5/ 21/ 46)/ from a
seeping 90-weight gear oil dispenser (Cook Deposition at 37),
and from oil changes occurring in each of the bays of the
automotive center (Cook Deposition at 55). The following
testimony summarizes the conditions in the automotive center on
the day of the accident:
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Q.

Did you have any other spillages of oil
down in that area?

A.' Well/ inasmuch as ::i t was a Saturday,
<• there i s oil all over the floor
By
the hole, there is usually oil or
antifreeze in each of the bays in *
auto center, (Cook Deposition at
* * * * *

Q.

The floor was slippery iu
guess?

uv

A

Well, a floor in any shop - - it doesn't
matter where it is — is always slick.
It doesn't matter where you are, the
least bit of oil or antifreeze 3 s
slick. It doesn't really matter what
part of the shop you are in there's
always something on the floor.

*~ H.me

T

And 5 oi 1 always have something s*.
then on your boots, then I guess?
A^

It

Yes, I would say so. That's alrno^
part of the automotive environment
There is always oil. (Cook D e p o s ^ , n
at 16- 1 7.)
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connection the drinking fountain had hi lliii'i accident i,s the

fortuitous fact that plaintiff had just finishing getting a
drink at the fountain when he pivoted around to respond to a
co-worker and lost his balance in the course of his pivot.
(Cook Deposition at 7, 31-32.)
While there was oil on the floor to the right of the
drinking fountain, plaintiff does not know whether that oil
resulted from the emptying of the waste-oil containers into the
floor drain, or from the fact that the plaintiff and his
mechanics stored the leaking waste-oil containers near the
drinking fountain all night and at times during the day.
Plaintiff testified as follows:
Q.

The oil that was in the area of the
drinking fountain on the day of your
accident could have come from those
leaking tanks?

A.

From the leaking tanks or possibly they
could have missed the drain a little
bit too.

(Cook Deposition at 47.)

In fact, plaintiff could not say

whether the oil on the floor near the drinking fountain had
"seeped" from the 90-weight gear oil dispenser or had been
spilled from the 10-40 weight bulk storage tank, both of which
were stored by plaintiff and his mechanics along the wall in

-18-

the area of cue aiiiiKj.iiy fountain.

Plaintiff testified H S

f> ::)] 1 ows:
Q.

Okay. Are you positive that the oil
that you slipped on came from someone
trying to deposit oil in the drain as
opposed to someone who spilt oil from
the surrounding storage tanks?

A.

We 11, a s I remembe r , when 1 g o t 11 [, i 11
was dirty because my clothes were
dirty. It was dirty oil.

Q-

Well/ the other oil — the oil that:
comes out of the storage tanks — once
its on the floor, does it still appear
clean?
I HI not an expert on that. * ~~~ w
know.

(Conk D e p o s i t i o n at in )
t h e (ill neai
MI

Indeed,

It

I he d r i n l u n q f o u n t a i n Uiiii

is iqiiiilly p r o b a b l e thai
I! i nicked by p l d i n l i(f
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Q.

....xd you have some oi 1

A.

^our boots that day?
I m sure just walking through the auto
center I would have oil or something on
:i t: (Cc •< k Deposition at: 7 ) ' '";;
* * * * *
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mi II IIIi*• M I I *•»;

I

Q.

I have a few more. If you would have
approached the fountain at the front of
the fountain as opposed to at the
side — at that corner as you described
it/ would you have had your feet in the
vicinity of spilled oil?

A.

I may have, I don't know. Now, as you
know as well as I do, anybody that even
touches oil is going to track it with
them. So any residual oil is going to
be there — oil tracks all over the
place.

Q.

Right.

A.

Like one drop will spread 6 inches s o — .
(Cook Deposition at 54.)

The cause of plaintiff's injury was oil and lots of it
everywhere and from many sources.

To use plaintiff's own

words, the cause of his injury was the "automotive
environment.

There is always oil."

(Cook Deposition at 17.)

It was not caused by the proximity of the drinking fountain to
the floor drain.

Plaintiff admits that a drinking fountain

located anywhere in the shop would be surrounded by oil residue
tracked by the mechanics.

Plaintiff testified as follows:

Q.

So everyone has oil on the bottom of
their soles regardless of where you put
the drinking fountain you're going to
have oil residue in front of the
drinking fountain, are you not?

A.

That's why I said they shouldn't have
done a fountain there period. Well,
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anywhere that you put the — well, if
the fountain was in the customer
waiting area there wouldn't have been
oil up there.
Q.

So you're saying there shouldn't have
been any drinking fountain in any part
of the auto shop itself?

A.

I don't think I would put one there
when I made the store.

(Cook Deposition at 54-55.)

Plaintiff even admits that he was

required to be in the vicinity of the floor drain during the
working day to fulfill his duties and responsibilities/
notwithstanding the location of the water fountain.

Plaintiff

testified as follows:
Q.

Other than in your supervisory
capacity, did you periodically go to
each of the bays during the day?

A.

During the day I was in all the bays
all day long depending on the
workload. If it was extremely busy, I
tried to help the people in the shop as
much as I could.

Q.

So even if the drinking fountain hadn't
been in the location that it was, you
still would have been in the vicinity
of that oil during the day; is that
correct?

A.

I would say so, yeh.

Q.

Okay.
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But everybody is.

A.

There is always a certain amount of oil
on the floor.

(Cook Deposition at 55-56.)
It is not insignificant that during the year preceding
this accident, after using the drinking fountain between one
and five times a day, the plaintiff never thought that the
proximity of the drinking fountain to the floor drain was a
dangerous situation.

(Cook Deposition at 39.); Cf., Webster

v. Sill, supra.
Judge Roth's entry of summary judgment for defendants
should be affirmed for the reason he stated in his ruling, "it
would be a waste of time to send this case to trial".
Transcript on Appeal at 2, Addendum 1.

A triable issue of fact

arises only when reasonable minds could disagree.
Blackham. 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664, 666 (1966).

Hall v.
On the

facts submitted by plaintiff, all reasonable minds must agree
that plaintiff has not shown it more probable than not that the
location of the drinking fountain was a substantial factor in
causing this accident.

To decide for plaintiff on the issue of

causation in fact, a juror would be required to speculate that:
(1)

plaintiff was somehow more vulnerable to slipping

in oil because he had just completed getting a drink of water
from the drinking fountain; and
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(2)

the oil on the floor near the drinking fountain

was from oil which had missed the floor drain during the
emptying of the waste-oil containers and was not from a leaking
waste-oil container left near the drinking fountain/ a seeping
90-weight gear oil dispenser, a spill from the 10-40 weight
bulk storage tank, the leaking of the hydraulic racks in the
bays ten feet to the south or from oil tracked on the soles of
mechanic's shoes from the bays where oil changes and other
servicing was occurring.

This Court has repeatedly held that

jurors ought not be permitted to engage in such speculation and
conjecture.
POINT II

PLAINTIFF CANNOT CREATE A TRIABLE
ISSUE OF FACT BY FILING AN AFFIDAVIT
CONTAINING CONCLUSIONARY ALLEGATIONS
IN CONTRADICTION OF PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
Recognizing the failure of the facts presented by
plaintiff in his deposition to present a triable issue on
proximate cause, plaintiff's counsel filed at the time of the
hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment an affidavit of
plaintiff which contradicted the clear and unequivocal
testimony quoted above with the following conclusionary
allegations:
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2.

On November 21, 1981, I was injured by
a fall while using a drinking fountain
at Sears Automotive Center in Ogden,
Utah.

3.

The injury would not have happened but
for the fact that the drinking fountain
and oil drain were placed so close to
each other than an accident was
inevitable.

4.

I believe the poor placement of the
drinking fountain next to the oil drain
was the principal cause of my injury.

(R. 148).
This Court stated in Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
v.

Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) that:
A major purpose of summary judgment is to
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to present
to the fact finder. In accordance with this
purpose, specific facts are required to show
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
The allegations of a pleading or factual
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient
to raise a genuine issue of fact.

Similarly, in Webster v. Sill, supra at 1172, this Court stated:
To raise a genuine issue of fact, an
affidavit must do more than reflect the
affiant's opinions and conclusions." Walker
v. Rocky Mountain Recreation, 29 Utah 2d
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). The affidavit
must Mset forth specific facts1' showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R.
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Civ.P. 56(e). The mere assertion that an
issue of fact exists without a proper
evidentiary foundation to support that
assertion is insufficient to preclude the
granting of a summary judgment motion.
Leininaer v. Stearns Rogers Mfg., 17 Utah 2d
37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965); Foster v. Steed, 19
Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967).
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit of plaintiff are
clearly conclusionary and insufficient to raise a genuine issue
of fact.

Each of the above quoted paragraphs is contradictory

of plaintiffs prior deposition testimony.

In Webster v. Sill,

supra, this Court stated that a party may not raise an issue of
fact by an affidavit which contradicts previous deposition
testimony unless it appears to some substantial likelihood that
the deposition testimony was in error for reasons which appear
in the deposition or an adequate explanation for the
contradiction is contained in the affidavit.
1172-73.

675 P2d at

In this case, plaintiff has not explained the

contradictions between his affidavit and deposition testimony
and, while correcting other testimony, plaintiff did not change
his deposition testimony when preparing his errata sheet.

This

Court must, therefore, disregard paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of
plaintiffs affidavit.

As this Court recognized in Webster v.

Sill, "[a] contrary rule would undermined the utility of
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summary judgment as a means of screening out sham issues of
fact."

675 P.2d at 1173.
CONCLUSION
The Honorable Judge David E. Roth's Summary Judgment

in favor of defendants and third-party defendant should be
affirmed.
DATED this

Y_ day of March, 1987.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

CraigTRT MaViger,' Esq

u
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ADDENDUM
Transcript on Appeal, Summary Judgment hearing,
August 20, 1986.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY

DENNIS COOK,
Plaintiff,
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
-vs-

Civil No. 94076

CHRISTIANSON BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al,
Defendant

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came
on for hearing before the HON. DAVED E. ROTH, Judge of the
above entitled Court, sitting without a Jury, on August 20,
1986.
WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had, to wit:

A p p e a r a n c e s ;
JACK HELGESEN, ESQ.,
Attorney for Plaintiff;
RAYMOND BERRY, ESQ.,
Attorney for Defendant

THE COURT:

I am going to grant the Motion for

Summary Judgment. —
The facts, apparently undisputed facts, are that the
Plaintiff simply slipped and fell in a garage area.
oil on his shoes.

There was oil on the floor.

Had

Apparently

oil all over the area of the garage.
The Plaintiff claims that the causation or proximate
causation of the accident was the negligent design and
construction whereby the sump was located within 18 inches
of the water fountain.

I don't buy the argument.

I don't

think the sump location and the water fountain location
being 18 inches apart is the cause of this accident.

Citing

specifically the Cook vs. Mortenson case, I believe this
most appropriately is in line with the facts in this case
supporting the decision.

I think it would be a waste of

time to send this case to trial.
MR. BERRY:

Thank you, your Honor.

Should I

prepare the Order?
THE COURT:

Get together between the four of you

and decide who prepares the Order.

Circulate it among

all parties.

2

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH.

)

County of Weber

) ss.
)

I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of
the Official Court Reporter for the State of Utah, and a
competent machine shorthand writer;
That I reported in machine shorthand the proceedings
had in the matter of Dennis Cook vs. Christianson Brother
Construction, Inc., et al, on August 20, 1986.
That thereafter, I reduced a portion of my machine
shorthand notes to typewriting, and the foregoing transcript,
page 2, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of
Judge Rothes ruling in the above entitled matter.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
4th day of March, 1987.

»s N. cJcfiies
O f f i c i a l Court R e p o r t e r
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